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On both national and international levels, the production of energy from
nuclear sources is one of the most highly regulated human activities. The
intricate web of global, regional, and State-wide controls operate to ensure that
materials related to the peaceful production of nuclear power are not diverted
for use in illicit weapons programs. From the beginnings of the nuclear age,
nuclear policy has been based on two primary goals: the encouragement of
expansion of civilian nuclear power facilities into new areas of the world, and the
desire to limit the number of States with the capabilities to produce nuclear
weapons. On one level, the global non-proliferation regime has been remarkably
successful over the past thirty-five years. While three States acquired nuclear
weapons from 1945-54, the rate of "overt" horizontal proliferation' has declined
in each ensuing decade: two States acquired nuclear weapons from 1955-64, one
State joined the nuclear weapons club from 1965-74,2 and no other State has
seen fit to claim military nuclear status 3 or has been conclusively demonstrated
to have acquired nuclear weapons since.4 However, on another level the non-
proliferation regime has clearly not eliminated the possibility of new nuclear
perils. Iraq, Israel, India, Pakistan, Argentina, Brazil, and South Africa are
among the States which have taken at least some steps toward the manufacture
of nuclear explosives,5 and several other States have both the access to materials
and technological capability to undertake nuclear weapons programs.6
* B.Sc., Imperial College (University of London); LL.B., M.Phil., Leicester Polytechnic. The
author is a Chartered Engineer working in the nuclear contracting industry. He is also a Research
Associate in the Environmental Law Unit at Leicester Polytechnic. The author would like to thank
Donald O'Hare of the California Western International Law Journal for his substantial editorial
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1. "Horizontal proliferation" refers to the acquisition of nuclear weapons by previously non-
nuclear weapons States.
2. This includes the "peaceful" nuclear explosion undertaken by India.
3. See, e.g., Sanders, Non-Proliferation in the Year 2000, in 9 DISARMAMENT 106 (1986).
4. See generally Fischer, International Safeguards, in SAFEGUARDING THE ATOM: A CRITICAL
APPRAISAL 8 (J. Goldblatt ed. 1985); Nonproliferation Regime: Safeguards, Controls and Sanctions,
in THE NUCLEAR CONNECTION: A REASSESSMENT OF NUCLEAR POWER AND NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION
187-89 (A. Weinberg, M. Alonso & J. Barkenbus eds. 1985).
5. See, e.g., L. SPECTOR, THE UNDECLARED BOMB (1988); LIMITING NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION
(J. Snyder & S. Wells eds. 1985).
6. See, e.g., Fialka, North Korea May be DevelopingAbility to Build Nuclear Weapons, Wall St.
J., July 19, 1989, at A16.
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This Article examines the impact of legal regulation of nuclear energy between
States. Limiting the access of non-nuclear weapons States ("NNWS") to nuclear
materials and technology remains the linchpin of the non-proliferation system.
As the focus of new civilian nuclear power installations moves from the
traditional market economy States of the West toward the States of former
Eastern bloc and other newly-industrializing States, the rigorous system of
nuclear materials safeguards must move to accommodate the shifting locus of
world nuclear activity. While the international safeguards system is highly-
developed, the global accounting system it has erected is often supplemented by
even more stringent national export and bookkeeping regulations in leading
nuclear States,7 and by non-treaty agreements between the world's leading
suppliers of nuclear materials and technology.8 The emerging nuclear power-
producing States, which have assumed new importance as "second-tier sup-
pliers,"9 generally lack such supplemental safeguards, and international controls
must be ready to take full account of the operating procedures of the new
facilities in these States. The changing global context of nuclear power
production (and the attendant increase in the nuclear materials trade) highlights
the words of Dr. Norbert Pelzer that: "Chernobyl has shown that national
regulation is not enough." 10
Nuclear energy has been found to be a viable source of electrical energy, and
nuclear reactors now produce over seventeen percent of the world's electricity.
As noted above, the patterns of past and future nuclear expansion are decidedly
different. In 1988, nuclear power programs in Member States of the Organ-
ization for Economic Cooperation and Development ("OECD") accounted for
nearly eighty-one percent of the total nuclear-generated electricity in the
world.lZ However, by 2005 it is expected that OECD States will account for
only two-thirds of all nuclear power.' 3  This reflects the expected rapid
development of nuclear facilities in the former Soviet bloc States of the now-
defunct Council for Mutual Economic Assistance ("CMEA") and in States which
7. For example, the U.S. Nuclear Nonproliferation Act of 1978, 22 U.S.C. §§ 3201-3282
(1988), unilaterally imposed new conditions on existing supply agreements.
8. See infra section III.B.2. for a discussion of the role of the London Supplier's Group.
Additionally, multinational bodies have traditionally closely regulated and monitored exports of high-
technology devices with potential nuclear weapons applications. The most prominent of these bodies
(the Coordinating Committee for Multinational Export Controls or "COCOM") had previously
required that producers of such items obtain licenses prior to exporting to Eastern Europe. To assist
development of the region after Soviet domination ended, COCOM lifted controls over the sale of
a wide range of high-tech items on July 1, 1990. The items cleared for export included several "dual-
use" items with nuclear weapons applications. Mann, Iran's Nuclear Plans Worry U.S. Officials, L.A.
Times, Jan. 27, 1991, at A28-29.
9. See New Nuclear Suppliers: Second-Tier Issues, in THE NUCLEAR SUPPLIERS AND
NONPROLIFERAT1ON 93-128 (R. Jones, C. Merlini, J. Pilat & W. Potter eds. 1985).
10. Pelzer, Current Problems of Nuclear Liability in the Post Chemobyl Period-A Gennan
Standpoint, 39 NUCLEAR L. BULL, June 1987, at 66.
11. 1989 Y.B. INT'L AToMIC ENERGY AGENCY, at C8.
12. Id.
13. Id at C9-10.
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are outside both the OECD and former CMEA. This emerging regional pattern
of nuclear growth will present new challenges for international control
mechanisms.
Additionally, there is always the risk of surreptitious diversion of the materials
and the technology of manufacturing fissionable materials for weapons, and the
theft of nuclear materials. An Oak Ridge study on the feasibility of a "quick and
dirty" reprocessing plant for extracting plutonium from spent fuel rods concluded
that a "bandit nation" could have a nuclear plant in operation in six months
which could produce enough plutonium to make ten bombs per month. t4
Another problem with the use of nuclear energy is that an aggressor in an
armed conflict can attack a nuclear installation, such as a power plant, despite
international agreements prohibiting such attacks. For example, in November
1987, the Bushehr reactor in Iran was targeted by Iraqi warplanes,15 and the
United States has bombed nuclear reactors within Iraq.
1 6
These dangers, which are inherent in the use of nuclear energy, illustrate the
need for control at the international level. This Article will examine inter-
national laws regarding the control of nuclear weapons, materials and knowledge.
The Article will also examine the experience of these laws and their impact.
Additionally, references will be made to the numerous international agreements
structuring liability for nuclear accidents or incidents, and the role that these
agreements play in encouraging or discouraging the. spread of the peaceful uses
of nuclear technology. In conclusion, this Article will point out that although
numerous international arrangements exist, the international control of nuclear
energy is far from complete.
I. THE NECESSITY OF INTERNATIONAL NUCLEAR SAFEGUARDS:
NUCLEAR REGULATION AND JUS COGENS
The international controls over nuclear weapons, materials and knowledge are
so firmly entrenched that it has been suggested that there is now an international
norm prohibiting States from entering into agreements which would encourage
the horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons. In international law there are
certain fundamental legal norms that individual States may not vary by
agreement. This is termed jus cogens.17 Examples include the general pro-
hibitions against genocide and slavery. Jus cogens is characterized by four
criteria: a foundation in morality; importance to international peace and order;
14. The Times (London), Mar. 5, 1978, at 2.
15. At the 1985 Review Conference of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, Iran alleged that
Iraq had attacked its nuclear facilities. As part of a compromise, mention of the Iranian allegations
was excluded from the Conference's Final Declaration, reproduced as U.N. Doc. NPT/CONF.III/64/1.
See Shaker, The Legacy of the 1985 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference, in NUCLEAR
NON-PROLIFERATION: AN AGENDA FOR THE 1990S 18-19 (J. Simpson ed. 1985).
16. For a discussion of attacks on alleged nuclear weapons program facilities in the Middle
East, see Mann, supra note 8, at Al.
17. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, opened for signature May 23, 1969, art. 53,
U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 39/27, reprinted in 8 I.L.M. 289 (1969).
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general acceptance in the international community; and service to global
interests rather than those of the individual State. 8
In examining the sale of nuclear weapons, Walter Gang] concludes that such
action would be in violation of jus cogens since the prohibition of nuclear
weapons proliferation is a fundamental norm of international law.'9 He further
argues that the sale of peaceful nuclear technology, for example the generation
of electricity, should be removed from international commerce until more
demonstrably effective safeguards are developed to prevent the illegal movement
and use of weapons grade material. Such safeguards should include the
inspection of nuclear installations, and audits of material stocks and records
involving the movement and use of peaceful nuclear technology by inspectors
from international organizations.
Regardless of whether the duty to protect against the spread of dangerous
nuclear technology has risen to the status of a fundamental peremptory norm in
international law, it is clear that all States with nuclear programs have
voluntarily accepted at least some degree of international control over their
nuclear activities. The implementation of effective safeguards closely followed
the development of nuclear power generation. In fact, the peaceful development
of nuclear energy has been enabled and positively encouraged by agreements
between States and international organizations. Thus, while the duty to avoid
nuclear proliferation may not be regarded as jus cogens, it is perhaps a more
likely candidate for status as a norm of customary international law." As noted
above,21 no State has admitted to joining the nuclear weapons club in nearly
thirty years, and India's detonation of a "peaceful" device in 1974 marks the most
recent conclusive demonstration of horizontal proliferation. Thus, it has been
argued that the treaties forming the non-proliferation regime form a new source
of customary international law binding on both signatories and third parties.22
II. THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL CONTROLS:
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS
After World War II, Western States foresaw the development of nuclear
energy replacing fossil fuels as essential to the continual well-being of mankind.
The early attempts to internationalize the promotion of nuclear energy were not
successful. The Acheson-Lilienthal Report in 1945, which led to the Baruch
Plan,23 advocated an international agency "to which should be entrusted all
18. Note, The Jus Cogens Dimensions of Nuclear Technology, 13 CORNELL INT'b L.. 63 (1980).
19. Id at 74-77.
20. See McFadden, Nuclear Weapons Free Zones: Toward an International Framework, 16 CAL.
W. INT'L L.J. 217, 236-38 (1986).
21. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
22. McFadden, supra note 20, at 237.
23. Bernard Baruch, Speech at the 1st United NationsAtomic Energy Commission, July 2, 5, and
12, 1946.
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phases of the development and use of atomic energy."24 Unfortunately, the
Baruch Plan was frustrated by Soviet non-cooperation. The development of the
peaceful use of atomic energy was forced into independent national programs
following the United States McMahon Act?2 The McMahon Act prevented the
dissemination of information about U.S. research leading up to the explosion of
the atom bomb. In 1954, when it became clear that States other than the U.S.
were making independent moves in bomb development and peaceful uses, the
spirit of cooperation was rekindled by the Eisenhower initiative.26 From this
developed the International Atomic Energy Agency ("IAEA") and the conven-
tions concerning the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and the liability for
nuclear damage in case of an incident at a nuclear installation. Nuclear energy
has since been developed to the point where it is a viable alternative to fossil
fuel energy. It is said to be a cheaper, cleaner, and more reliable means of
providing electrical power.2 7 Criticisms of this conclusion have been made.?
However, details published regularly by the United Kingdom's Central Electricity
Generating Board 29 ("CEGB") run counter to this criticism. In recent years,
interest in nuclear energy has been renewed by the realization that the
environmental risks associated with nuclear power may, in the long run, be
significantly lower than those associated with energy generated from fossil
fuels.3°
Through treaties, those States possessing nuclear weapons have endeavored to
limit the proliferation of bomb-making materials. These treaties 31 have limited
the possession of independent means of bomb manufacture. Under the treaties,
States are required to enact legislation to prevent the diversion of bomb-making
materials and equipment by fraud, theft, or deliberate means. There are,
however, certain States that are not bound by treaties; moreover, some who are
bound are able to rationalize the clandestine breach of those treaties. These
States may be able to manufacture atomic bombs.
While the limitation of nuclear weapons proliferation has provided the impetus
for most international controls, the potential for damage and injury caused by
the release of radioactive contamination has also encouraged the development
24. U.S. State Department Publication 2498, Report on the International Control of Atomic
Energy, Mar. 1946.
25. Atomic Energy Act of 1954 ("McMahon Act"), 42 U.S.C. §§ 2011-2296 (1988), as amended
by Act of Aug. 30, 1954.
26. United Nations, Atoms for Peace, U.N. General Assembly, 8th Sess., 1954.
27. 26 NUCLEONICS WEEK 9 (1985).
28. See, e.g., D. PEARCE, DECISION MAKING FOR ENERGY FUTURES (1979).
29. The Central Electricity Generating Board is the sole supplier of electricity in the United
Kingdom. The Board has an obligation under the Electricity Act of 1957 to provide low cost
electrical power. If privatization is undertaken, the separate companies formed will not have the
statutory obligation to meet supply demands.
30. In particular, nuclear energy production does not contribute gases which exacerbate global
warming. See generally Goodrich, Hans Blix: Nuclear Energy Could Ease Climate Change, Christian
Science Monitor, Oct. 30, 1989, at 8.
31. See infra section II.
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of international agreements. Whether radioactive materials are carelessly
released into the evironment, the channeling of responsibility to the nuclear
plant operator is not sufficient. Little immediate damage will exist from the low
level of releases and may not reach a danger level until after the operator has
disappeared. Following the Chernobyl accident in the Soviet Union in April
1985, more attention has been focused on this problem and conventions have
been established whose concern is early notification and international assistance
in the case of a nuclear emergency. 2
Following the Eisenhower initiative, three international organizations were
formed: the International Atomic Energy Agency ("IAEA") by the United
Nations; the Nuclear Energy Agency ("NEA") by the OECD; and the European
Atomic Energy Community ("EURATOM"), now embodied within the European
Community ("EC"). Together, these organizations are an integral component in
the implementation of the rules and procedures which form the ground level of
a global non-proliferation regime.33
A. The International Atomic Energy Agency
The statute of the IAEA3 was ratified by the United Kingdom on July 29,
1957 and came into force on that day. As of August 1989, there are 113 State
signatories to the Statute. Article II of the statute describes its objectives:
The Agency shall seek to accelerate and enlarge the contribution of
atomic energy to peace, health and prosperity throughout the world.
It shall ensure so far as it is able, that assistance provided by it or at
its request or under its supervision or control is not used in such a
way as to further any military purpose.
The agency is authorized by article III of the statute to encourage and assist
research and development of atomic energy for peaceful purposes; to make
provision of materials, services,35 equipment and facilities to meet the needs of
research and development for the needs of the underdeveloped world; to foster
the exchange of scientific or technical information and to encourage the training
of scientists and experts; to establish and administer safeguards to ensure that
knowledge, materials and equipment are not used to further any military
purpose; and to establish standards of safety for the protection of health and
32. See infra section III.D.
33. For an examination of the prerequisites to the formation of an international "regime" and
the status of the non-proliferation system as a coherent regime, see Smith, Explaining the Non-
Proliferation Regime: Anomalies for Contemporary International Relations Theory, in 41 INTERNATIONAL
ORGANIZATnONS 253 (1987).
34. Opened for signature, Oct. 26, 1956, 8 U.S.T. 1094, T.I.A.S. 3873. The IAEA statute has
been amended twice, in 1963 and in 1970.
35. Ha Vinh Phuong, Procedures for the Supply of Materials Through the 1AEA, OECD-NEA
Paris 1985, at 61-65.
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property. 6 In a review of twenty-five years of operation of the IAEA,37 the
Director General, Dr. Hans Blix, noted that the agency had promoted its work
with considerable success in the field of food and agriculture, medicine, energy
and nuclear safety in a practical way and without much drama.
It is significant that although the IAEA deals only with the peaceful uses of
atomic energy, it administers a far-reaching and systematic on-su.e inspection of
the industrial and development activities of 114 non-nuclear weapon States who
are signatories to the Non-Proliferation Treaty.3 Following the Chernobyl
nuclear reactor accident in the Soviet Ukraine, the IAEA investigated and
convened an international conference to determine the reasons for the
accident.39 The IAEA was instrumental in setting up the conventions for
notification of neighboring States in the event of a nuclear accident with trans-
border implications and for mutual assistance between States in that event. 40
B. The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
and the Nuclear Energy Agency
The OECD was created by the Convention of the Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development signed in Paris on December 14, 1960, and came
into force on September 30, 1961. The signatories to the Convention originally
were nineteen European States and the United States. Subsequently, four non-
European States joined. 4' The NEA was established on April 20, 1972. The
Member States of the OECD, together with the Commission of the EC, take
part in the work of the NEA. The primary objectives of the NEA are the
promotion of cooperation between the members in the safety and regulatory
aspects of nuclear development, and the assessment of the future role of nuclear
energy as a contributor to economic growth. The NEA works in close
collaboration with the IAEA, with which it has concluded a Cooperation
Agreement to achieve its objectives
[by] encouraging harmonization of governments' regulatory policies
and practices in the nuclear field, with particular reference to the
safety of nuclear installations, [and the] protection of man against
ionizing radiation and preservation of the environment. [The
Agreement also encourages the harmonization of radioactive] waste
management and nuclear third party liability and insurance . . .
keeping under review the technical and economic characteristics of
nuclear power growth and of the nuclear field cycle, and assessing
36. Ha Vinh Phuong, L4EA Safety Standards, Their Legal Status and Implementation, OECD-
NEA Paris 1985, at 3-7.
37. 24 IAEA BULL. SUPP., 1982, at 3.
38. See infra section lI.A.
39. 28 IAEA BULL., 1986, at 9.
40. See infra section II.D.
41. Twelfth Report of the OECD-NEA (1983).
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demand and supply for the different phases of the nuclear field cycle
and the potential future contribution of nuclear power to overall
energy demand;.., developing exchanges of scientific and technical
information on nuclear energy, particularly through participation in
common services; . . . [and] setting up international research and
development programmes and undertaking jointly organized and
operated by OECD countries.42
In the field of legal affairs, the NEA is responsible for the administration of
the Paris Convention on Third Party Liability in the Field of Nuclear Energy
43
and the Brussels Convention Supplementary to the Paris Convention.44  In
September 1988, the NEA and the IAEA jointly convened a conference in
Vienna where a Joint Protocol was adopted and signed by twenty States.s
Taken as a whole, the Paris and Brussels Conventions, along with the Vienna
Protocol, outline the basic principles governing the liability of: (1) the operator
of a nuclear facility; and (2) the State where the facility is located in the event
of damage exceeding specified limits.
The liability issues raised by the disposal of nuclear substances in the context
of waste management and decontamination of nuclear installations was
considered by the NEA in 1983. It was agreed by the NEA experts that the
definition of "nuclear installation" in the Paris Convention should include waste
disposal facilities. However, other arrangements may be needed for the post
closure phase.46
C. The European Atomic Energy Community
The EURATOM was created by the European Atomic Energy Community
Treaty, which entered into force on January 1, 1959. On January 22, 1972, the
United Kingdom signed the Accession Treaty for membership in the European
Economic Community and the EURATOM. The European Communities Act
(1972) gave this legal effect in the U.K.47 The basic aim of the EURATOM
Treaty is "to contribute to the raising of the standard of living in Member States
and to the development of exchanges with other countries by creating conditions
42. Description of Licensing Systems and Inspections of Nuclear Installations 149-55 (OECD-
NEA 1980).
43. See infra section III.D.; Strohl, The Concept of Nuclear Third Party Liability and its
Implementation by Legislation in OECD Member Countries, OECD Paris 1985, at 70-85.
44. See infra section III.D.
45. See von Busekist,A Bridge Between Two Conventions On Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage:
The Joint Protocol Relating to the Application of the Vienna Convention and the Paris Convention, 43
NUCLEAR L. BULL. 10 (July 1989).
46. Long- Term Management of Radioactive Waste, Legal Administrative and Financial Aspects
at 86-88 (OECD 1984).
47. The European Communities Act 1972 § 2, 42 Halsbury's Statutes of England (3d), at 79.
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necessary for the speedy establishment and growth of nuclear industries."48
Article 2 of the Treaty provides that to achieve this aim, the Community will:
promote research and the dissemination of information; establish and ensure the
application of uniform safety standards for the protection of health; facilitate
investment and ensure particularly by encouraging business enterprise the
creation of the basic facilities necessary for the development of nuclear energy
in the Community; ensure a regular and equitable supply of ores and nuclear
fuels to all users in the Community; establish the necessary control measures to
ensure that nuclear materials are not diverted to purposes other than those for
which they are intended; exercise the right of ownership of special fissile
material; create a common market for specialized nuclear material and
equipment; and co-operate with other countries and international organizations
to promote the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. 9
In international dealings, the EC may act for its constituent members. It may,
as in the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, ° allow its
partners to act separately but at the same time be party to the Treaty in the EC.
In this latter case it was necessary to clarify the position for third parties by a
separate statement.51
It can be seen from the foregoing that the common intent of these treaties is
the encouragement of the development of nuclear energy by cooperation and
agreement. This intent has not always been carried out consistently. For
example, under article 93 of the EURATOM Treaty, the free transfer of nuclear
materials is allowed between Member States. However, under the IAEA Treaty,
ten States have submitted a list of materials and facilities that would not be
exported to non-nuclear weapon States without prior IAEA agreement.
Therefore, the nuclear weapons States within the EC have agreed to the free
transfer of materials to non-weapon States within the EC, but have fettered their
freedom to do so without IAEA permission. Thus, a European nuclear plant
operator using fuel exported from the United States would have to agree to
limitations regarding the place of reprocessing before a U.S. export license would
be granted to satisfy the terms of the U.S. Non-Proliferation Act.52
48. Treaty Establishing the European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM), art. 1, 298
U.N.T.S. 169, 172.
49. Id. art. II.
50. See infra note 60. The Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials
requires each party to the Convention to ensure that nuclear material is protected to an agreed level
while in transit within the party's territory. The Convention does not apply to nuclear material used
for military purposes.
51. Statement by the representative of the Commission of the EC at the informal meeting on
the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials, Vienna, Sept. 24-25, 1979.
52. See supra note 7.
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III. CONTROL OF NUCLEAR MATERIALS, KNOWLEDGE AND WEAPONS
A. International Conventions Concerning Nuclear Materials,
Physical Protection and Safeguards
Three major concerns arise from the use of nuclear energy: (1) the possible
use of nuclear weapons and therefore war; (2) the spread of radioactive
contamination in the environment; and (3) the liability for nuclear damage in
such an event. These concerns are manifest in a nuclear explosion. The
manufacture of a nuclear explosive device, given the economic resources, the
knowledge, and the nuclear material, can be undertaken by persons with access
to everyday machine tools and conventional materials.53 Therefore, controlling
the spread of nuclear weapons can only be achieved by controlling the nuclear
materials and knowledge. Limitations on the risk of environmental contamina-
tion by radioactive releases from nuclear explosions is accomplished by treaties
which seek to eliminate5 4 or control55 such explosions.
States which already have nuclear weapons may reduce the risk of contamina-
tion and war by limiting the number of weapons they possess as well as
controlling their use (limiting the vertical proliferation of nuclear weapons).56
States without nuclear weapons may reduce the risk of contamination and war
by refusing to develop them, thereby keeping the total number of States with
nuclear weapons to a minimum (limiting horizontal proliferation). Limitation
of horizontal proliferation has been achieved by the Non Proliferation Treaty5
("NP") signed by weapons States and by non-nuclear weapons States alike. The
Treaty limits the transfer of knowledge, facilities, and nuclear materials.
Possession of nuclear materials (and therefore potential nuclear weapons) by
non-weapons States who are not a party to the NPT is controlled to some extent
by national legislation of weapons States," by common policy between States,
53. See generally Who has the Bomb? TIME 36 (June 3, 1985); Blix, Building Confidence, 26
IAEA BuLL., at 5 (1984); comments by Senator John Glenn, N.Y. Times, Apr. 26, 1981, sec. IV, at
3.
54. The Antarctic Treaty, openedfor signature Dec. 1, 1959, 12 U.S.T. 794, T.I.A.S. No. 4780,
402 U.N.T.S. 71; The Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration of
Outer Space Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, opened for signature Jan. 27, 1967, 18
U.S.T. 2410, T.I.A.S. 6347, 610 U.N.T.S. 205; The Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in
Latin America, opened for signature Feb. 14, 1967, 634 U.N.T.S. 281 [hereinafter Tlatelolco Treaty].
55. The Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapons Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outerspace, and Under
Water, opened for signature Aug. 5, 1963, entered into force, Oct. 10, 1963, T.I.A.S. 5433,480 U.N.T.S.
43.
56. The limitation of vertical proliferation ("arms control") continues to be the subject of
discussion and negotiation between the nuclear weapons States, primarily the U.S. and the U.S.S.R.
57. Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, opened for signature July 1, 1968,21
U.S.T. 483, T.I.A.S. 6839, 729 U.N.T.S. 161.
58. See, e.g., the U.S. Non-Proliferation Act (1978), supra note 7. Under the Act the U.S. can
control future disposal of nuclear fuel in such a way as to constrain the freedom of European
operation of fuel reprocessing plants from treating foreign fuel.
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and by the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials. 59 As
will be seen later,60 a small number of States have, nevertheless, made nuclear
weapons. The NPT, signed by 136 States as of 1987, is a "bargain" between
nuclear weapons States and non-nuclear weapons States whereby:
" the nuclear weapons State agrees not to transfer and the non-nuclear
weapons State agrees not to accept or seek or receive assistance in the
manufacture of nuclear explosives 61 (ie., the limitation of horizontal
proliferation);
" all parties agree to participate in the exchange of equipment, materials and
technological information for the peaceful use of nuclear energy,6' and
that potential benefits from the peaceful application of nuclear explosives
will be made available to non-nuclear weapons States;63 and
" each of the parties undertake to pursue negotiations in good faith to cease
the nuclear arms race" (i.e., the limitation of vertical proliferation).
The undertaking must be verified by participation in a safeguards system
before the assistance is granted. A safeguards agreement must be signed by the
non-nuclear weapons States with the IAEA in accordance with article III of the
Treaty. Article III(A)(5) of the IAEA statute authorizes the agency
to establish and administer safeguards designed to ensure that special
fissionable and other materials ... are not used in such a way as to
further any military purpose and to apply safeguards, at the request
of the parties, to any bilateral or multilateral arrangement, or at the
request of a State, to any of that State's activities in the field of
atomic energy.'u
The objective of safeguards is "the timely detection of diversion of significant
quantities of nuclear material from peaceful nuclear activities to the manufacture
of nuclear weapons or of other nuclear explosive devices or for purposes
unknown and the deterrence of such diversion by the risk of early detection." 66
By June 1985, 84 States had signed safeguards agreements and safeguards
measures were in force in 78 States. At the end of 1987, safeguards were in
place in 57 countries converting 905 nuclear installations. 67
59. Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials, opened for signature Mar. 3,
1980, 28 I.L.M. 1419 (1979).
60. See infra section III.B.2.
61. Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, supra note 57, arts. I, II.
62. Id. art. IV sec. 2.
63. Id. art. V.
64. Id. art. III sec. 2; art. VI.
65. Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency, supra note 34, art. IIl.
66. IAEA Does. INFCIRC/66/Rev2; INFCIRC/153 (corrected).
67. Schuricht & Larrimore, SafeguardingNuclear Fuel Cycle Facilities, 30 IAEA BULL. 8(1988).
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Despite the NPT, it is possible that unsafeguarded facilities which are
connected to the flow of nuclear material might also exist within NPT States.6
As indicated above, any State with a sufficiently well-developed infrastructure can
create a nuclear explosion. However, it would take three to four years and
significant amounts of appropriate nuclear materials would be required. The
first signs of such development should theoretically be revealed in safeguards
reports and should give the rest of the world time to react. However, in practice
this may not be the case as safeguards are applied at four different levels:
" under the NPT, for non-nuclear weapons States, all nuclear materials in
present and future nuclear activities fall under safeguards agreements (i.e.,
"Full Scope Safeguards");
" safeguards are applied in regional agreements such as the Tlatelolco
Treaty;69
* safeguards are applied under bilateral agreements outside the NPT and will
in such cases be limited to specific facilities only; and
" safeguards are applied only to civil facilities by nuclear weapons States
(France 1981; U.K. 1978; U.S. 1980; U.S.S.R. 1985) which leaves military
facilities unmonitored.
Only in the first case can there be reasonable certainty that nuclear material
is not being diverted. In the three remaining cases there is the danger of
dversion. Also, there are nuclear weapons States who are not party to the
NPT 70 and there are non-nuclear weapons States who are not party to the NPT
who have nuclear programs and who may well be making nuclear weapons."
In order to block possible loopholes, the U.S. introduced the Non-Proliferation
Act 72 which requires the application of full safeguards before approving the
export or re-export by the third country of nuclear material, equipment, or
assistance. However, without similar action by all nuclear weapons States, this
Act is only of limited value.
Finally, the NPT itself is set for a review conference in 1995.13 While a total
68. See generally H. Gruemann, 25 IAEA BULL. 27-29 (1983).
69. See supra note 54. For a discussion of the Tlatelolco Treaty, see infra section III.B.1.
70. In particular, the States which admittedly possess nuclear explosive devices are China,
France, and India.
71. Chief among these are Argentina, Brazil, Israel, Pakistan, and South Africa.
72. See supra note 7.
73. By its terms, the future of the NPT beyond its initial authorized period can only be decided
at a conference of the parties. Thomas Graham, Jr. of the United States Arms Control and
Disarmament Agency outlines the 1995 possibilities as follows: (1) If no conference is held or no
agreement reached, the NPT will continue in force indefinitely until there is an agreement as to its
fate; (2) If a review conference is held and agreement is reached, the agreement will by the terms of
the NPT be limited to either continuing the Treaty indefinitely or continuing for a fixed period or
periods of time. The review conference may not impose new substantive conditions for the
continuation of the NPT. Graham, The Duration of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty: Sudden
Death or New Lease on Life? 29 VA. J. INT'L L. 661 (1989).
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collapse of the NPT regime is highly unlikely,74 it is probable that many States
will voice serious concerns similar to those set forth in previous decennial
conferences. Underlying the tensions in NPT negotiations is the basic realization
that the NPT attempts to cement the world nuclear order which existed in the
mid-1960s. Some States feel very strongly that the NPT regime results in a
"certain dilution and diminution of sovereignty,"5 and the nuclear weapons
States must continue to persuade these States that their interests are best served
by the continuation of the safeguards system and the rejection of nuclear
weapons. Nevertheless, barring the total collapse of the regime, even if the NPT
is not renewed the individual IAEA and Tlatelolco Treaty safeguards agreements
would remain in tact.76 However, given the nature of the safeguards documents
themselves, IAEA safeguards would no longer apply to most plants in EURA-
TOM, or to any of the reactors in the East European non-nuclear weapons
States.77 The uncertain status of the NPT regime after 1995 has highlighted the
importance of other nuclear controls at the State and regional level, as well as
the importance of the growing self-policing of the nuclear industry itself. The
main aspects of these control mechanisms are described below.
B. Control of Nuclear Weapons, Materials and Knowledge
1. Weapons Control Treaties. The Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapons Tests in
the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under Water 78 is an agreement by the
U.S., U.S.S.R. and U.K. to prohibit and prevent nuclear explosions in the
atmosphere, outer space, underwater, and in an environment which would cause
radioactive contaminated debris outside the territorial limits of the State for an
unlimited period.79  Each party also undertook to refrain from causing,
encouraging or participating in a nuclear explosion anywhere in those environ-
ments. The Treaty, therefore, allows each of the three States to freely conduct
underground explosions in its own territory and to participate in similar
explosions in a third country. The non-signatory weapons States of France,
China, and India have now similarly restricted testing to underground sites.8s
Radioactive contamination in the atmosphere has been reduced as a direct result
74. ME at 675. Graham finds it "difficult to imagine the parties deciding to end the Treaty,
given the degree to which international efforts to allow nuclear commerce have been integrated into
a network of safeguards agreements." Id
75. See Quester, Preventing Proliferation: The Impact of International Politics, in NUCLEAR
PROLIFERATION: BREAKING THE CHAIN 214 (1981).
76. See Pilat, A World Without the NPT? in NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION: AN AGENDA FOR
THE 1990S 167 (J. Simpson ed. 1987).
77. See Fischer, Defects of the Safeguards Documents, in SAFEGUARDING THE ATOM, supra note
4, at 85.
78. The Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapons Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outspace, and Under
Water, supra note 55.
79. Id. art. I, para. 1(a), (b).
80. For a detailed discussion of India's nuclear program, see Cronin, India and Pakistan, in
LIMITING NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION, supra note 5, at 59-88.
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of the implementation of this Treaty.
In certain parts of the world the presence of nuclear weapons has been
completely prohibited by agreement. The Antarctic Treaty8l between twelve
States which have a direct interest in the area prohibits nuclear explosions and
the depositing of nuclear waste material.82 However, with the agreement of all
the parties, peaceful research (perhaps including peaceful nuclear explosions)
may be allowed. In the Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States
in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space Including the Moon and Other
Celestial Bodies,s3 the U.S., U.S.S.R. and U.K. agreed not to place nuclear
weapons outside the earth's atmosphere.8s The depositing of nuclear waste is
subject to prior consultation between the signatories, However, France, China
and India (weapons States with the technological capability to launch nuclear
weapons into orbit) are not signatories to the Treaty.
In the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America ("The
Tlatelolco Treaty"), s6 parties who have a territorial interest in the area and all
nuclear weapons States have agreed to use nuclear material and facilities
exclusively for peaceful purposes and to prohibit and prevent nuclear weapons
in the area.8 7  Twenty-three States have signed and ratified the Treaty.
Argentina has signed but not ratified. Brazil and Chile have signed and ratified
but have not taken up a waiver3 allowing the Treaty to become effective when
all States in a defined region of Latin America ratify the Treaty.8 9 The
participation of these three States is therefore perfunctory. Unlike the NPT
itself, the Tlatelolco Treaty prohibits "the receipt, storage, installation,
deployment and any form of possession of any nuclear weapon, directly or
indirectly, by the Parties themselves, or by anyone on their behalf or in any other
way."90 Thus, the Treaty closes the gaping NPT "loophole" which allows a
weapons State to place nuclear weapons on the territory of a non-nuclear
weapons State as long as the possession and control of the weapons remains with
the nuclear State.
The Tlatelolco Treaty has two protocols. One requires the ratification of the
Treaty by States outside the area which have de jure or defacto responsibility for
territories within the region. The Treaty requires that States sign an IAEA
Safeguards Agreement which allows the IAEA to carry out periodic, systematic
81. The Antartic Treaty, supra note 54.
82. Id. art. V.
83. The Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration of Outer
Space Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, supra note 54.
84. Id. art. IV.
85. Id. art. IX.
86. Tlatelolco Treaty, supra note 54.
87. Id art. I.
88. Id art. 28(2).
89. Id art. 25.
90. Id art. 1(b).
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inspections of nuclear installations.9' The second protocol requires that all
recognized nuclear weapons States guarantee that they will respect the regime
established by the Treaty, that they will not contribute to any actions which
might entail a violation of the Treaty, and that they will not use or threaten to
use nuclear weapons against parties to the Treaty. At present, the second
protocol has been signed by all admitted nuclear weapons States. India (which
has exploded a nuclear device) has not signed.
While the Tlatelolco Treaty has not yet achieved its objective, its existence has
allowed the clear identification of intent to prohibit nuclear weapons in a large
area of the world. However, it is also clear where possible violations of the
Treaty may originate. Brazil, which has the financial capacity to make a bomb
92
(the cost to a State with some existing nuclear facilities to make a bomb is less
than ten million dollars per year over four to five years), and an operating
nuclear power station, is attempting to set up a nuclear fuel manufacturing
facility.93 In addition, Brazil has an uranium enrichment facility94 and has not
signed a safeguards agreement with the IAEA. Chile has a research reactor,
supplied by the U.K., and has also not signed a safeguards agreement with the
IAEA. Argentina has the financial strength to embark upon a nuclear weapons
program and it has two power reactors, one of which uses natural uranium, and
has on-load refuelling (a "CANDU" reactor). This latter reactor allows the
easier removal of irradiated fuel from power reactors, which makes tracing
nuclear materials considerably more difficult. Such fuel may be used as
feedstock for reprocessing recovery of the fissile material used in nuclear
weapons. 95 Argentina is hopeful of reaching a safeguards agreement 96 but is
reported to be building a pilot fuel reprocessing plant with assistance from
Germany and Italy.97 Argentina is resisting the ratification of the Tlatelolco
Treaty and claims that the Treaty offers no protection against nuclear weapons
States introducing nuclear weapons into the Latin American region. Argentina
also rejects the U.S. interpretation that the Treaty definition of "nuclear
weapons" includes peaceful nuclear explosions; and it further disagrees with the
U.S.'s refusal to consider the prohibition of transport of nuclear weapons in the
region. The Argentine government is concerned that the reports from the
special inspections mandated under the Treaty will not remain confidential.
Despite the staunch opposition from both Brazil and Argentina to the
"discriminatory" NPT system, the two States recently agreed among themselves
91. Id. art. 28(1).
92. For an approximation of the cost of nuclear weapons programs, see, e.g., BRrro,
INTRIGILAT')R & WICK, STRATEGIES FOR MANAGING NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION 248 (1983).
93. House, Brazil Reveals Secret Military Nuclear Project, The Independent (London) Sept. 9,
1987.
94. See NUCLEONICS WEEK, Apr. 14, 1988, at 6.
95. J. GOLDBLAT, NON-PROLIFERATION: THE WHY AND THE WHEREFORE 70 (1985).
96. NUCLEONICS WEEK, Oct. 18, 1984, at 9.
97. NUCLEONICS WEEK, May 30, 1985, at 4.
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to ban production of nuclear weapons and to prohibit nuclear tests.
98
It can be seen, therefore, that there are significant obstacles to achieving the
full list of the objectives of the Treaty: "[t]he military denuclearization of Latin
America,... a measure which will spare their 9 eople from squandering of [sic]
their limited resources on nuclear armaments." However, the Treaty has acted
as a stimulus to the institution of similar measures in other areas of the world,
most notably in the Indian Ocean and the South Pacific. The nuclear weapons
States' interests in the South Pacific have been exposed by the sinking of the
"Rainbow Warrior," a ship which was leading a protest against French weapons
tests in the South Pacific area. 1'0 The South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone
Treaty, 10' (the Rarotonga Treaty), which entered into force on December 11,
1986, calls upon the nuclear weapons testing States to refrain from using a
nuclear weapon against any party to the Treaty and from conducting nuclear
explosive tests in the zone. Additionally, the parties may not manufacture
nuclear weapons or allow the placement of nuclear weapons on their territories.
However, the wording of the Rarotonga Treaty may be construed to allow the
innocent passage of seagoing vessels carrying nuclear weapons, thereby calling
into question the very concept of the South Pacific as "nuclear-free."1
2
2. Non-Treaty Measures. Attempts have been made outside the Treaties to
control the transfer of nuclear fuel enrichment and reprocessing technology and,
hence, nuclear material manufacture. The London Suppliers Group, a club of
fifteen members, was set up in the 1970s. 103 Its guidelines include:
* "trigger list" items (i.e., special materials and equipment used in weapons
manufacture), should be exported only when covered by IAEA safeguards
and on receipt of formal assurances that exclude uses which would result
in a nuclear explosion;
* "trigger list" items should be under effective physical protection;
restraint should be exercised in the export of sensitive facilities and
technologies (i.e., those with reprocessing and enrichment applications) and
of weapons-usable materials;
* assurances concerning the possible future retransfer of "trigger list" items
98. In Review: Latin America, Los Angeles Times, Dec. 4, 1990, at H3. Brazilian President
Fernando Collor de Mello characterized the signing of the agreement as a "decisive step."
99. Tlatelolco Treaty, supra note 54, Preamble.
100. See generally Rieman, Creating a Nuclear Free Zone Treaty That is True to its Name: The
Nuclear Free Zone Concept and a Model Treaty, 18 DEN. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 209, 222 (1990).
101. Opened for signature Aug. 6, 1985, 24 I.L.M. 1440. See also Papadimitritroooulos, The
Raratonga Treaty: A Regional approach to Non-Proliferation in the South Pacific, 30 IAEA BULL. 31
(1988).
102. This is the interpretation by the United States. See Rieman, supra note 100, at 228-43.
103. The Nuclear Supplier's Guidelines C'NSG') do not constitute a formal international
agreement. A major accomplishment of the NSG was to persuade France, which is not a party to the
NPT, to require safeguards on its exports of nuclear materials. See, e.g, NATIONAL ACADEMY OF
SCIENCES (U.S.), NUCLEAR ARMS CONTROL: BACKGROUND AND ISSUES 235 (1985).
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should be required by the original suppliers of these items; and
* "best endeavors" should be exercised in advising prior consent for
reprocessing.
All major supplying States, 104 including France, subscribed to the guidelines.
However, the group only requires that safeguards be applied to the nuclear
materials supplied by their members. Argentina has been able to set up a full
unsafeguarded fuel cycle. The transfer of enrichment technology to Australia
and Mexico, both uranium exporters, is under negotiation. In addition,
discussions have been held by the U.S.S.R. with Libya and Cuba, none of which
subscribe to safeguards agreements.
A declaration of common policy by the Member States of the European
Community'05 was made on November 20, 1984. The declaration noted that
the Member States had adopted the IAEA guidelines for the export of nuclear
material, equipment or technology and declared a common policy regarding the
transfer of material between Member States. This declaration reaffirms the basic
principle of the EURATOM Treaty of unrestricted transfer of materials between
the Member States. However, the unrestricted transfer would run counter to the
NPT undertaking to adopt safeguards. Therefore, additional requirements for
monitoring and control of the transfer of nuclear materials between Member
States are laid down to satisfy the NPT undertaking. They are:
* common agreement regarding storage of plutonium and enriched uranium;
* certification of transfers, intermediate storage and use of plutonium and
enriched uranium; and
* a specific mutual agreement to transfer to a third state of plutonium and
uranium enriched to above twenty percent.
The EURATOM Treaty allows that installations and technology reacting to
enrichment reprocessing and production of heavy water may be transferred
between Member States provided it is operated only to produce enriched
uranium to not more than twenty percent (a level which is approaching weapons
grade material) without the agreement of the supplying Member State. The
retransfer of the facility or technology may only be made with the prior
agreement of the supplying Member State.
The measures described above are outside the NPT and, while they are
intended to effect control over non-nuclear weapons States who are not members
of the NPT, such measures can be seen to weaken the NPT. NPT members who
are non-nuclear weapons States are in fact at some disadvantage, and are not
exclusively given access to the technology and materials. Dr. Hans Blixt' 6 has
104. The United States, the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union, France, Germany, Japan,
Canada, Belgium, Italy, the Netherlands, Sweden, Switzerland, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Australia, and
Finland all stated early on that their nuclear export policies will adhere to NSG guidelines.
105. See 35 NUCLEAR L. BULL. (June 1985).
106. Blix, Safeguards and Non-Proliferation, 27 IAEA BULL., No. 2, Summer 1985, at 3-7.
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observed that the NPT has, nevertheless, since 1964 limited the number of
nuclear weapons States to less than the fifteen to twenty expected by President
Kennedy of the United States. 17 In a report of the IAEA on safeguards, it is
noted that no activities which would indicate a diversion of safeguarded material
have been detected, although some minor discrepancies have been found.10
However, a view from outside the IAEA is less reassuring. The nuclear
weapons States have not kept their part of the bargain to find ways of limiting
material proliferation; outside full-scope safeguards to which the report refers,
there is a firm indication of horizontal proliferation-France, China and India
have nuclear weapons. Israel, Pakistan, South Africa, Brazil and Argentina are
suspected of having weapons or of being close to having them. Other States, not
all of whom are outside the NPT, have made moves which, if successful, could
have placed nuclear weapons in their possession. South Korea, Taiwan, and
Chile have been and are still negotiating to obtain fuel enrichment technology.
In 1974, France withdrew from negotiations with South Korea to construct an
enrichment plant. There are other indications that States are moving towards
weapons capability: the Israeli bombing of the safeguarded Osirak research
reactor in Iraq was such an indication.10 9 If we take into account all of the
potential nuclear weapons States, President Kennedy's fears of there being
twenty weapons States in as many years may have become a reality, and the
IAEA expressions of confidence may be misplaced.
C. Protection of Nuclear Material from Terrorist Action
As well as the possible loopholes in the NPT which would allow the transfer
and use of nuclear materials to make nuclear weapons, the possibility of nuclear
material being stolen for use by non-treaty States or by terrorist organizations
forms a second major international concern. The physical protection of nuclear
material is entirely within the jurisdiction of the State. However, in interna-
tional transport the cooperation of States is necessary. To this end, the
Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials 10 entered into
force on February 8, 1987, with forty member States and twenty-one rati-
fications.' The Convention, which does not apply to nuclear material used
for military purposes,1 requires each party to the Convention to take steps to
ensure that nuclear material during international transport is protected to an
107. See J. NYE, STRATEGIES FOR MANAGING NucLEAR PROLIFERATION 279 (1976).
108. NUCLEONICS WEEK, July 11, 1985 at 14.
109. Such extreme self-help incidents also evidence the lack of complete confidence that some
States have in the efficacy of IAEA safeguards.
110. Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials, supra note 59.
111. Individual parties have enacted the substantive provisions of the Convention in their
municipal laws. For example, the United Kingdom ratified the Convention on March 3, 1980 and
some of its provisions became law by the Nuclear Materials (Offenses) Act of 1983, 12 Halsbury's
Statutes of England (4th), at 827.
112. Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, supra note 59, art. I.
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agreed level while in its territory. 113 Nuclear material is categorized according
to its usefulness as a feed stock for weapons1 4 and appropriate levels of
protection are specified. 15 Each party agrees not to export or import nuclear
material or to allow transit through its territory unless it is protected.16 In the
event of theft or suspicion of theft, the parties undertake to cooperate and
provide assistance in the protection and recovery of the material involved."7
The parties also agree to consult and cooperate in the design of physical
protection systems. Each party agrees to treat as punishable offenses the
intentional commission of certain acts'18 which include: (1) alteration or
disposal of nuclear material which is likely to cause death, serious injury or
damage to property; 19 and (2) an attempt or participation in such an act12
or a threat to cause damage or to refrain from an act.
D. Third Party Nuclear Liability
The third major concern relating to nuclear energy involves the risk of a
nuclear accident. Following the Chernobyl accident, the international commun-
ity moved quickly to codify the responsibilities of operators of reactors involved
in accidents and those of the States where a nuclear accident has occurred. The
area of liability has been addressed through the Conventions on Third Party
Nuclear Liability.' 2' Since the Chernobyl accident, the Convention on Assis-
tance in the Case of a Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency" entered
into force on February 26, 1987, and the Convention on Early Notification of a
Nuclear Accident'23 came into force on October 27, 1986.
To encourage the development of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, the
question of risk of nuclear damage was addressed in 1960 when sixteen European
States signed the Paris Convention.' 4 The signatories were "[d]esirous of
ensuring adequate and equitable compensation for persons who suffer damage
113. Id art. II.
114. Id Annex II.
115. Id Annex 1. For example, Category III (the lowest) material must be stored in a controlled
area; Category II material must be stored in an enclosed area under surveillance; and Category I
material must be stored as for II, where access to the areas must be restricted to persons who are
considered trustworthy and under surveillance by guards who are in close communication with
appropriate response forces.
116. Id art IV.
117. Id. art V.
118. Id art. VII.
119. Id art. VII(1)(a).
120. Id art. Vll(1)(f)-(g).
121. See infra notes 124, 126.
122. The Convention on Assistance in the Case of a Nuclear Accident or Radiological
Emergency, 25 I.L.M. 1377 (1986).
123. The Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident, 25 I.L.M. 1370 (1986).
124. Convention on Third Party Liability in the Field of Nuclear Energy (Paris Convention),
opened for signature July 29, 1960, modified by an Additional Protocol signed 28 July 1964, in IAEA,
INTERNATIONAL CONVENTIONS ON CIVIL LIABILrrY FOR NUCLEAR DAMAGE 22 (1976).
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caused by nuclear incidents whilst taking the necessary steps to ensure that the
development of the production and uses of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes
is not thereby hindered."125 The Paris Convention came into force on April 1,
1968, and established three basic principles, discussed in more detail below,
which apply to the operator of a nuclear facility: (1) absolute and exclusive
liability; (2) limitation of liability; and (3) financial security.
In the event of a nuclear incident where the damage exceeds the operator's
liability, the Brussels Supplementary Convention,126 which came into force on
December 4, 1974, sets down arrangements between States for sharing the cost
of compensation. The Vienna Convention,'1" which embodies the same
principals as the Paris Convention in a world-wide forum, came into force on
November 12, 1977. Two protocols to setting high compensation limits under
the Paris and Brussels Conventions were adopted on November 16, 1982. In
September 1988, a Joint Protocol was adopted by the IAEA and the NEA in
Vienna. The basic principles of the Paris Convention are set out below.'28
To ensure that the operator of a nuclear installation is exclusively liable for
nuclear damage while the material is being transported by sea, the Convention
Relating to Civil Liability in the Field of Maritime Carriage of Nuclear Material
was adopted in Brussels on December 17, 1971. Also adopted in Brussels on
May 25, 1962 was the Convention on the Liability of Operators of Nuclear Ships.
This was set up on the same principals as the Paris and Vienna Conventions and
will come into force when it is signed by a State which has authorized the
operation of a nuclear ship under its flag.
1. Absolute and Exclusive Liability. The Paris and Vienna Conventions have
the same objectives, which are based on the Paris Convention. The Paris
Convention will therefore be used to briefly outline their common principles.
The participating States agreed to the principle that the victim of a nuclear
incident is to obtain compensation without having to identify the person
responsible, or prove fault. Under the Conventions, the parties agreed to make
the proprietor of a nuclear installation strictly liable for the damage caused by
a nuclear incident to person and property.'2 A nuclear incident is defined as
an occurrence that causes damage. 130 This means that the operator is abso-
lutely liable for all damage caused by a nuclear incident either within, or in
transport to or from, his nuclear installation.
125. Id Preamble.
126. The Convention Supplementary to the Paris Convention of 29 July 1960 on Third Party
Liability in the Field of Nuclear Energy (Brussels Supplementary Convention), opened for signature
Jan. 31, 1963, modified by an Additional Protocol signed January 28, 1964. Text has been published
in IAEA, INTERNATIONAL CONVENTIONS ON CIVIL LIABILITY FOR NUCLEAR DAMAGE 43 (1976).
127. The Vienna Convention on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage, opened for signature May
21, 1963, 2 I.L.M. 727 (1963).
128. See infra section Ill.D.1.
129. Paris Convention, supra note 124, art. Ill.
130. Id art I.
20
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The operator is also exclusively liable; no other person is held liable for the
nuclear damage. All liability is "channelled" to the operator who is exonerated
only in limited cases where the particular States' legislation provides. For
example, the operator is not liable (1) where a carrier or person handling
radioactive waste would be liable in place of the operator, 131 or (2) where the
damage is caused by armed conflict 132 or by natural disasters which are
catastrophic and completely unforeseeable.,
Where nuclear damage is caused jointly by a nuclear incident and another
occurrence and the extent of the non-nuclear damage is not separate, the whole
damage will be covered by the Convention and the operator will be liable for the
entire damage.133 It is also agreed under the Convention that the normal rules
of tort of the participating State apply to claims or compensation of damage to
on-site property such as the reactor.134 Similarly, there is no recovery for
damage to the means of transport. 135
2. Limitation of Liability. Although under the Conventions it is agreed that
the operator is strictly liable for damage caused by a nuclear incident, the
liability under the Paris Convention is limited to a maximum of fifteen million
European Monetary Agreement units of account ("EMA u/a").'" The operator
is required to have insurance or other coverage for this amount to be drawn
solely for compensation of damage caused by a nuclear incident. 3 7 The effect
of this is that all insurance is channelled to the operator, and separate covers for
the various persons who might have been liable under common law is avoided.
The right to compensation is lost if the action is not brought within ten years
from the date of the nuclear incident.'3 The Brussels Supplementary Conven-
tion sets up two further levels of compensation: above 15 and up to 70 million
EMA u/a is covered by the government of the liable operator and between 70
and 120 million EMA u/a is shared between the parties of the Convention.
The Soviet Union is not a party to either the Paris or Vienna Conventions.
Therefore, the Chernobyl accident did not test the efficacy of the Conventions.
It is of concern, however, that the damage within the Soviet Union was far in
excess of seventy million EMA u/a, and damage to people may occur or become
manifest long after the ten year limitation period.
3. Social Security. In many States, persons suffering injury will receive
compensation through the social security system established by their government.
131. Id art. IV(d).
132. Id art. IX.
133. Id art. Ill(b).
134. Id art. lll(a)(ii)(1).
135. Id art. lll(a)(ii)(2).
136. Id art. VII. The EMA u/a is the European unit of account, also known as the European
Currency Unit ("ECU"). On March 25, 1991, 1 ECU = U.S. $1.23.
137. Paris Convention, supra note 124, art. X.
138. Id art. VIII.
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Under the Conventions, it is left to the contracting party to decide: (1) whether
the rights of such person vis-a-vis the operator will be contained or abolished;
(2) whether they can claim compensation from the operator in addition to social
insurance benefits; and (3) whether the social security institution concerned may
recover from the operator compensation furnished to persons injured. Under
the Conventions, a person who has had to furnish compensation under the law
of the non-contracting State is permitted to take legal action to acquire the right
of the person thus compensated. This right is not acquired by persons against
whom the operator has a right of action under the Convention.
4. Legal Action. The Conventions allow an operator to take legal action to
recover damages only where this course is expressly allowed by contract.
1 39
Such legal action may also be taken where damage is caused intentionally by the
individual sued' 40 or in case of transit of nuclear material through a State
which applies a higher limit of damages, and if the transport has been made
without consent. 141  Actions based on tort are precluded except where they
may involve the nuclear installation and property of the operator on the site of
the nuclear installation.142 The normal rules of tort apply to such damage
which may enable the operator to sue the supplier. The Conventions do not
prevent a State from taking criminal sanctions against persons who cause nuclear
damage by intentional or negligent acts or omissions. The operator's right of
action is not affected where the source of ionizing radiation is not covered by the
Convention1 43 or against other operators in case of joint liability.
The Conventions concentrate jurisdiction in the court of the State where the
nuclear incident occurred. 44 That State has jurisdiction even where damage
is sustained in another State and may not delegate to another State's courts any
claims for nuclear damage. 45
E. Experience of Nuclear Energy International Agreements
The contamination of the atmosphere by nuclear explosions has decreased
since the agreement to stop atmospheric testing. Meanwhile, the number of
potential nuclear weapons States and the number of weapons held by the nuclear
weapons States have both increased. The incomplete coverage of the major
multilateral treaties has led to more specific bilateral arrangements and informal
agreements. Nevertheless, both the arrangements made under multilateral
treaties and bilateral agreements depend on the effectiveness of safeguards and
139. Id. art. VI(f)(ii).
140. Id. art. VI(f)(i).
141. Id. art. VI(b).
142. Id art. III(a)(ii).
143. Id art 111(b).
144. Id art. XIII(a).
145. Id. art XIII.
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the IAEA. Operable safeguards systems have been set up and tested. For
example, the IAEA survey of the Osirak reactor was shown to be accurate in its
report. In order to ensure true limitations of weapons, full-scale safeguards must
operate and be seen to operate. This is not yet the case as nuclear weapons
States exclude weapons materials from safeguards, and bilateral treaties or
contracts only require safeguards on specific material covered by the treaties or
contracts. True non-proliferation will come only when all materials are the
subject of surveillance under safeguards. International control of nuclear
material has been proposed with the creation of plutonium banks, central storage
of high level waste, and central reprocessing on a regional basis.
14
Ever since the Atoms for Peace proposal it has been the guiding principle of
the non-proliferation regime that the economic advantages offered by the
peaceful uses of atomic energy provide the stimuli to induce non-nuclear
weapons States to eschew weapons programs. Many States, including South
Korea and Japan, would not be able to continue their present rate of economic
expansion without nuclear electricity. Other areas of the world benefit from the
advances in agricultural technology made possible by the irradiation techniques
for improvement of the strains of seeds and the irradiation of food to prevent
deterioration. 147 This technology will allow longer storage of food and assist
in alleviating famine. Should these inducements be sufficiently strong, and if the
NPT, safeguards, and the IAEA are effective, there will foreseeably be a
continuing limitation on the horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons.
The conventions on nuclear liability enable the operator of a nuclear
installation to have a finite financial risk from a nuclear accident. The States
party to the conventions share the risk up to an upper financial limit. However,
in light of the experience of the Chernobyl accident, it is evident that such limits
would be exceeded. In an address to the Munich Conference in 1984,' 48
Professor Herzog noted that under German law there is no barrier to the
amount of compensation for claims in spite of the language embodied in the
Convention. Herzog pointed out that for natural disasters such as floods, there
is no obligation for the State to compensate victims. However, it usually does
so without limiting the amount available for compensation. While strictly
outside the scope of this Article, it is interesting to note that the U.S. Price-
Anderson Act,1 49 which covers nuclear insurance, requires contractor indemnity
of seven billion dollars indexed every five years for inflation.
The question concerning priority of claims would arise in the event the value
of claims exceeds the various limits. Would, for instance, the costs of emergency
measures taken to prevent or minimize the consequence of a nuclear accident
be included? The question of the liability in connection with decommissioning
146. See, e.g., WALKER & LONNROTH, NUCLEAR POWER STRUGGLES (1983).
147. See generally the discussion of the growing array of peaceful uses of nuclear energy
outlined in 1989 Y.B. INT'L ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY.
148. International Conference on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage (OECD-NEA 1985).
149. 42 U.S.C. § 2012 (1988).
1991]
23
Riley: The Legal Control of Nuclear Energy Between States
Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons, 1991
326 CALIFORNIA WESTERN INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 21
and the final disposal of waste is not clearly stated in the conventions and needs
further study. The problem of proving causation inherent in claims for injuries
from occupational radiation exposure caused by the inadvertent or planned
escape of radioactive material (not by an explosion but by leakage deliberate or
accidental) is still to be resolved.
The concept of absolute and exclusive liability for damage caused by a nuclear
incident was initiated by international agreement. The concept of keeping risk
as low as reasonably achievable ("ALARA") has been fostered by the inter-
national bodies set up to promote and regulate the use of nuclear energy. For
example, in English law these two concepts have come together against the
background of health and safety legislation in the Nuclear Installations Act of
1985 and the conditions attached to a licenses granted under that Act. The use
of ALARA has been challenged in the courts,'50 and while the courts have not
rejected the use of the concept in licensing, they do not fully support its use in
all respects under the Act.
In the United Kingdom, the operator of a nuclear installation is liable for
damages up to the limit of twenty million pounds set by the Nuclear Installations
Act of 1986. The owner of an industrial facility using radioactive materials is not
strictly liable and liability could only be established by action in the court. The
damages in a case similar to the one involving the release of a radioactive
isotope from a scrapped radiotherapy machine in Brazil in 1987 would amount
to many tens of millions of dollars. 1 Uncertainties exist, however, where the
damages arise from government action and not from the radiation itself, for
example, the restriction of the slaughter of sheep for consumption to prevent the
spread of radiation following the Chernobyl accident. Within the United
Kingdom, such damages have been compensated by the government. However,
a foreign government may also dispute liability, as seen in the Chernobyl
incident, where the U.S.S.R. refused compensation to the United Kingdom.
Court decisions in the United States have failed to establish a rational basis
for determining eligibility for compensation in such cases which have inherent
deferred radiation damages. Already in the U.S. the courts are extending the
liability regime beyond that covered in the Convention. In Silkwood v. Kerr-
McGee Corp. ,12 the United States Supreme Court approved a state court award
of punitive damages in a radiation industry case. Today, personal injury claims
are typically brought by nuclear installation workers both in the U.K. and the
U.S. These claims have so far usually been settled out of court even though the
150. R. v. British Nuclear Fules plc. (June 1985) Crown Court Carlisle, U.K. (unpublished).
In this case BNF was fined for releasing liquid radioactive waste into the Irish Sea. The waste had
a radioactivity level lower than that authorized by a license under the Radioactive Substances Act
(1960), but the jury decided that this level was not "as low as reasonably achievable."
151. For an account of the widespread injuries caused by this accident involving the theft and
dismantling of a piece of medical radiology equipment, see The Radiological Accident in Goiana,
Brazi4 1989, Y.B. INT'L ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, Annex at D91.
152. 464 U.S. 238 (1984).
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cause of damage was not admitted to result from a nuclear incident. 15 3
Although the courts have begun to chip away at the firm liability limits
imposed by the conventions, the limitations on liability form an important part
of international nuclear energy policy. Clearly, these conventions will continue
to act as a spur to the installation of new nuclear facilities in each of the States
party to the conventions. The promotion of the value of peaceful uses of
nuclear energy forms an essential part of the "bargain" underpinning the entire
global non-proliferation regime. It is hoped that the fear of very stringent
limitations on future nuclear trade which would undoubtedly follow a conclusive
showing of widespread horizontal proliferaton will act as a strong disincentive
to the States on the brink of acquiring nuclear weapons.
CONCLUSION
The development of weapons and the generation of electricity using nuclear
energy has been carried out with full knowledge of the potential harm which may
be caused by uncontrolled use. This development has been fostered by the
political process. Nuclear materials and the technology have been used for the
generation of electricity as an alternative to coal and oil. From a broad
perspective, the complex system of international, national, and industry-wide
controls has operated to encourage the growth of the nuclear energy industry
through the minimization of certain types of politically unacceptable risk. The
risk of diversion of material and technology to weapons manufacture is
minimized by the arrangement under the NPT which facilitates effective
inspection of nuclear installations as part of IAEA safeguards agreements.
Similar arrangements are in place to prevent the diversion of nuclear materials
to terrorist activity and to States not party to the NPT. While these treaties
have not prevented the spread of the manufacture of nuclear weapons entirely,
proponents of the modern non-proliferation regime can point to several
impressive achievements. For example, the treaties concerning the testing of
nuclear weapons have been effective in limiting the amount of radioactive
contamination in the atmosphere. In subscribing to the arrangements under
treaties, States have accepted obligations to the international community for the
control and inspection of material stocks and nuclear reactor inspections.
Concerns for international security and protection of the environment have
tempered the explicit and implicit encouragement given to the nuclear industry
by national and international legislation and agreements. The question of the
impact of nuclear programs on the environment is implicit in the regulation of
radioactive material. The question of the final disposal of radioactive waste has
yet to be resolved. It poses questions of liability stretching many generations
into the future. Dumping at sea, even though legally permitted for low level
153. For a more extensive discussion of problems of causation in radiation injury claims, see
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waste, has been suspended because of adverse public opinion. The search for
additional surface sites for the burial of low level radioactive waste has similarly
been suspended because of adverse public opinion.
This analysis has shown that while there are limited international arrangements
to prevent the spread of nuclear installation, and while governments have legal
obligations to protect the public in the event of a nuclear incident, such
arrangements are far from complete. In the international arena, the efficacy and
political implications of the non-proliferation regime will come under close
scrutiny as the NPT nears possible expiration in 1995. Even barring the unlikely
collapse of the NPT, the new focus of nuclear power expansion in the non-
OECD States will present challenges to the IAEA safeguards bureaucracy as
these non-OECD States begin to emerge as a new second-tier of nuclear
suppliers not subject to the self-regulation of the London Supplier's Group. It
is likely that the continued globalization of nuclear power will result in new
controls and organizations at both the worldwide and regional levels as the world
attempts to cope in a new nuclear context.
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